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173 
INSTITUTIONALIZING CONSENT MYTHS 
IN GRADE SCHOOL 
SHAWN E. FIELDS 
Scholars and advocates have long decried antiquated notions of consent 
in the criminal law of rape and sexual assault. Significant progress has 
been made to redefine consent in criminal codes and in our collective 
consciousness as freely given, informed, enthusiastic, explicit, revocable, 
and to be considered from the perspective of the consenting party. But 
despite this progress, the criminal justice apparatus continues to fixate on 
details irrelevant to the consent calculus, such as the victim’s dress, when 
making evaluations about consent. This obsession with the victim’s clothing 
reflects a troubling willingness to imply consent or, alternatively, blame the 
victim for provocatively “asking for it.” Significant scholarship has 
demonstrated the corrosive impact of this fixation, resulting in a 
“credibility discount” of women making sexual violence allegations, the 
acquittal of defendants engaged in clearly criminal sexual conduct, and a 
concomitant reluctance of female victims of sexual violence to even engage 
with the criminal justice system. 
None of the foregoing is new or particularly controversial. But while this 
unfortunate reality has been well examined, this Article reflects upon a 
lesser-explored, early root cause of the status quo: the hard wiring of 
consent myths in grade school through gendered dress codes and the 
gendered messaging these dress codes institutionalize about consent. 
Increasingly pervasive, increasingly sex-obsessed dress codes feed 
narratives at an early age that girls are sexual objects who are responsible 
for the assaultive behavior of perpetrators and who “ask for” any 
unwanted sexual attention their dress may attract. 
This Article highlights the dangerous, highly sexualized justification 
often given by school administrators for gendered dress codes: a desire to 
create a “distraction-free learning environment” for boys. This messaging 
sexualizes underage girls, forces them to become hyper-cognizant about 
their physical identity, and signals a male entitlement to act inappropriately 
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towards the female body for which the female will be punished. At root, 
these dress codes, and the justifications behind them, normalize and excuse 
sexually predatory behavior as a natural “distracted” reaction while 
blaming the victim for provoking the unwanted behavior. This 
institutionalization—which continues to grow—naturally feeds corrosive 
narratives that persist in criminal sexual assault adjudications, including 
implied consent, the requirement of a “perfect victim,” and the myth of the 
“unstoppable male.”  
I. Introduction 
In 2015, a dress code policy at Woodford County High School in 
Versailles, Kentucky received national media attention when a student who 
appeared to be dressed appropriately was nevertheless sent home because 
her collarbone was exposed.1 A photo of the student wearing the outfit in 
question soon went viral on the internet and led to confusion about the 
nature of her offense (see Figure 1).2 According to the school, her clothing 
amounted to a technical violation of its facially gender neutral dress code, 
which prohibited skirts and shorts that fall above the knee and shirts that 
extend below the collarbone.3  
The rationale behind the dress code and the enforcement of this technical 
violation—“that certain articles of girls’ attire should be prohibited because 
they ‘distract’ boys”—led students at the school to take action.4 After 
finding that “[g]irls were disciplined disproportionately” and were 
unilaterally singled out for causing a distraction to the opposite sex, several 
students led an online campaign to protest what they viewed as sexist dress
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Ashley Lewis, Kentucky High School Students, Parents Fight Strict Dress Code 
That Requires Girls to Cover Collarbone, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 17, 2015, 3:36 PM), 
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/female-student-reprimanded-showing-
collarbone-article-1.2328582. 
 2. Id. (“The angry parent posted a picture of the offending outfit – a creme tank top 
with a white cardigan – which was shared nearly 40,000 times.”). 
 3. Esther Crain, Teen’s Exposed Collarbone Sets Off Dress Code Controversy, 
YAHOO! NEWS (Aug. 18, 2015), https://news.yahoo.com/teens-exposed-collarbone-sets-off-
dress-code-127004652707.html. 
 4. Li Zhou, The Sexism of School Dress Codes, ATLANTIC (Oct. 20, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/10/school-dress-codes-are-problematic/ 
410962/. 
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Figure 1 
 
codes.5 “Many of these protests have criticized the dress codes as sexist in 
that they unfairly target girls by body-shaming and blaming them for 
promoting sexual harassment.”6 
This episode illustrates the many ways so-called “modesty-based” dress 
codes7 institutionalize myths about sex and consent. Dress codes 
disproportionately target and affect girls for their inherently dangerous and 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Id.; see also Rachael Krishna, Young Women Are Protesting Against Dress Codes 
With #IAmMoreThanaDistraction, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 4, 2015, 12:01 PM ET), https:// 
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/krishrach/young-women-are-protesting-against-dress-codes-
with-iammoret.  
 6. Zhou, supra note 4. 
 7. Deborah M. Ahrens & Andrew M. Siegel, Of Dress and Redress: Student Dress 
Restrictions in Constitutional Law and Culture, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49, 76 (2019) 
(summarizing the harms of “imposing modesty-based dress restrictions on female students”). 
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distracting bodies.8 They sexualize minor female bodies, place the onus on 
girls to take steps to prevent being objectified, and then place blame on girls 
for the sexually predatory actions of others.9 In addition, the dress codes 
excuse boys for improper conduct because they simply cannot resist certain 
temptations.10 Finally, the dress codes reinforce the notion that girls who 
dress a certain way impliedly consent to otherwise unwanted behavior and 
are less deserving of society’s protection. 
The problem is pervasive and growing. Written, mandatory dress codes 
exist in approximately sixty percent of the public schools in the United 
States, up from just under forty percent in 1990.11 Many of these dress 
codes explicitly set different standards for boys and girls, often requiring 
only girls to prevent showing collarbones or shoulders, underwear, or 
cleavage or bra straps.12 Many other facially neutral dress codes 
disproportionately affect girls, including prohibiting spaghetti strap tank 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Meredith Johnson Harbach, Sexualization, Sex Discrimination, and Public School 
Dress Codes, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2016) (“[M]any dress codes are explicitly 
gender-specific . . . or are at least selectively enforced such that they impact female students 
disproportionately.”); see also Jolie Lee, Dress Code Crackdown: N.Y. School Hands Out 
200 Detentions, USA TODAY (Sept. 15, 2014, 10:25 AM ET), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation-now/2014/09/15/dress-code-tottenville-high-school-new-york/15657299/ 
(recalling the imposition of a new dress code at Tottenville High School in Staten Island 
where “90% of the [dress code-related] detentions went to female students”).  
 9. See Harbach, supra note 8, at 1058 (placing gendered dress codes in “a broader 
cultural setting that too frequently sexualizes females and blames them for unwanted sexual 
attention”); Zhou, supra note 4 (“[O]ne of the key concerns is the implication that women 
should be hypercognizant about their physical identity and how the world responds to it.”); 
see also id. (quoting a female high school student who claimed, “My principal constantly 
says that the main reason for [it] is to create a ‘distraction-free learning zone’ for our male 
counterparts.”).  
 10. See Harbach, supra note 8, at 1044. 
 11. See Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 61 n.58; Zhou, supra note 4; see also Fast 
Facts: School Uniforms, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/ 
display.asp?id=50 (last visited May 28, 2020) (“From 1999-2000 to 2015-16, the percentage 
of public schools reporting that they required students to wear uniforms increased from 12 to 
21 percent.”). 
 12. Judith Valente, Kingsley Junior High Dress Code Targeting ‘Bra Straps, Cleavage’ 
Unleashes Backlash, WGLT.ORG (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.wglt.org/post/kingsley-
junior-high-dress-code-targeting-bra-straps-cleavage-unleashes-backlash#stream/0 (quoting 
message to parents from principal regarding dress code) (“Shorts should cover students’ 
entire bottoms, there should be no bare shoulders, no visible bra straps and no midriff 
showing. Shirts that show excessive cleavage are also not appropriate for school.”). 
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tops, shorts above the knee, or the showing of midriffs.13 Constitutional 
challenges to these dress codes have largely been unsuccessful, as courts 
have found legitimate justifications based on fostering a productive learning 
environment.14 But recent compelling evidence showing that dress-code-
violating girls are disproportionately punished compared to their dress-
code-violating male counterparts may offer a future avenue for these 
claims, particularly given the significant disruption to the educational 
experience brought by forcing a violator to remedy a dress code 
infringement.15 
Beyond litigation, this Article draws on the obvious and troubling 
parallels between school dress code enforcement and criminal sexual 
assault adjudication to explore how seemingly innocuous modesty-based 
dress codes perpetuate a male-centric system of implied consent and 
general entitlement to sexual conduct. By confronting the shocking ways 
children internalize myths about male sexual entitlement, morally inferior 
victims, and excusable predatory urges, this Article contends that needed 
change can, and should, take place more urgently both in the schoolhouse 
and the courthouse. 
II. A Brief History of School Dress Codes 
Formal school dress codes, including the adoption of school uniform 
policies, are a surprisingly recent phenomenon in American public 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See Steve Nelson, Dress Codes in Schools: Spaghetti Straps, Midriffs; Adults’ Need 
for Control, HUFFPOST (May 31, 2016, 12:55 PM ET), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ 
dress-codes-in-schools-sp_b_10223596.  
 14. See, e.g., Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 392, 393 (6th Cir. 
2005) (rejecting First Amendment challenges to modesty-based dress codes in part because 
teachers claimed the dress code “led to fewer ‘disruptions and distractions from students 
wearing revealing, distracting, and inappropriate clothing’”); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 291 (5th Cir. 2001) (“While Parents may have a fundamental right 
in the upbringing and education of their children, this right does not cover the Parents’ 
objection to a public school Uniform Policy.”); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 
(1975) (finding that issues of public education are generally “committed to the control of 
state and local authorities”).  
 15. For a discussion of the disproportionate impact of school dress code enforcement on 
girls, see infra Part II. See also Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1229–30 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(explaining that under Title IX, “once plaintiffs have shown that a facially neutral practice 
has a disparate impact, defendant[s] may still prevail by proving a business or educational 
necessity for the practice”) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971))). 
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schools.16 This Part provides context for the evolution of dress code 
policies, from an informal system of heteronormative assimilation to 
increasingly formal authoritative attempts to address political protests, 
“countercultural” expressions, gang and other violence, and the purported 
rise of child sexualization. 
The United States has a largely unwritten history of public school dress 
norms and restrictions. “As best as scholars have been able to determine, 
dress norms and expectations were ubiquitous in American education up 
until the late 1960s, but formal dress codes were surprisingly rare and 
public school uniforms were almost—perhaps entirely—unheard of.”17 
“Despite the persistent use of dress and appearance norms to stifle the 
cultural expression of minority groups and to foster assimilation throughout 
American society,” little record exists of formal policies mandating such 
uniformity in public schools prior to the period of cultural upheaval 
defining the 1960s and 1970s.18 
A. Pre-Tinker: Counterculture, Vietnam, and Free Expression 
Child psychologists have long observed that the adolescent period marks 
an important moment for children to find individuality in their expressive 
selves, separate from the adults around them.19 The “Baby Boom” 
generation reached adolescence at roughly the same time the United States 
began fracturing along cultural and political lines, highlighted most 
prominently by the civil rights movement and the war in Vietnam.20 Not 
surprisingly, students in this period “adopted new clothing styles and 
                                                                                                                 
 16. See Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 61. 
 17. Id. at 55 (“Styles and expectations for dress were typically set by students’ peers and 
the larger community, turned on material availability, reinforced gender and class norms, 
and reflected broader cultural values.”). 
 18. See id. at 55–56; see also Deanna J. Glickman, Fashioning Children: Gender 
Restrictive Dress Codes as an Entry Point for the Trans* School to Prison Pipeline, 24 AM. 
U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 263, 284 (2015); Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 894, 965 (2019) (discussing adverse impacts of rise in gendered dress 
codes on trans and gender-queer students). 
 19. See Maria Piacentini & Greig Miler, Symbolic Consumption in Teenagers’ Clothing 
Choices, 3 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 251, 261 (2004); MORRIS ROSENBERG, SOCIETY AND THE 
ADOLESCENT SELF-IMAGE 3–4 (1965). 
 20. TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE 18 (1987); see James 
Wright, The Baby Boomer War, NY TIMES (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/04/11/opinion/the-baby-boomer-war.html?auth=login-email&login=email.  
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grooming habits—chosen in part to intentionally differentiate themselves 
from older generations and established cultural norms.”21  
In response, “representatives of those generations and norms pushed 
back, adopting increasingly formal and specific guidelines for student dress, 
hair length, and facial hair.”22 These guidelines arose not from a concern 
about school safety or a desire to protect the sanctity of the learning 
environment, but from a fracturing of established norms and a stated desire 
to maintain assimilative notions of white, male, heteronormative, and 
inherently conservative uniformity.23  
This overt attempt to mandate such cultural uniformity, however, was 
short-lived. During a decade of litigation contesting these dress codes on 
First Amendment expression and substantive due process grounds, students 
won a string of victories in state and federal court recognizing the 
constitutional right of students to express themselves through their 
presentation and to retain a zone of autonomy in the dress and presentation 
choices they made.24 Reflecting the general attitude of courts at the time—
an attitude that seems positively foreign in today’s educational climate—
one California court expressed not only “great skepticism as to whether 
uniform policies were legal [but] great confusion as to why a district would 
feel the need or authority to adopt one.”25 
The most famous and enduring decision from this period, Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District,26 laid down the parameters 
still in use today for determining the constitutionality of a school dress code 
provision. The United States Supreme Court considered First Amendment 
challenges to a school’s suspension of students for wearing black armbands 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 56. 
 22. Id.; see also Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 610 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (“This is 
another of the multitude of lawsuits which have recently inundated the federal courts 
attacking hair length regulations promulgated by local public school authorities.”). 
 23. Cf. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 55 (explaining that dress codes were 
persistently used to encourage adherence to cultural norms). 
 24. See, e.g., Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1972) (finding that the hair 
length regulation lacked justification for infringing on the student’s rights); Richards v. 
Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1st Cir. 1970) (concluding that the suspension of a student 
for wearing his hair too long violated his constitutional personal liberties). But see Jackson v. 
Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir. 1970) (upholding hair length regulation). 
 25. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 57; see Noonan v. Green, 80 Cal. Rptr. 513, 515 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969). 
 26. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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in protest of the Vietnam War.27 The Court famously explained that 
“[n]either students [n]or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom 
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,” finding that schools can 
only restrict such conduct if it would “materially and substantially interfere 
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school.”28 Applying this standard, the Court invalidated the school 
suspensions as they were motivated by “a mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint.”29  
Courts following Tinker interpreted the Court’s language as requiring 
some hard evidence, rather than mere conjecture, that a restriction on 
expression was necessary to allow a school “to carry out [its] educational 
mission.”30 Few opportunities existed to test this new stringent approach, 
however, as formal school dress codes began to disappear from public 
school handbooks shortly after the 1969 Tinker decision.31 
B. Post-Tinker: The Rise of Formal Dress Code Policies 
After nearly a generation of relative silence, school dress codes became a 
topic of concern once again in the 1990s. Only this time, dress codes were 
heralded as a potential solution to the purported scourge of gang violence 
infecting public schools.32 This cultural and political shift reflected the 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. at 504–05. 
 28. Id. at 506, 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
 29. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 30. See, e.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971) (determining that 
under the circumstances it was not “necessary to infringe on the students’ right to carry out 
the educational mission of the school”); Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156, 162 (E.D. Ark. 
1972) (explaining that students possess broad freedoms “subject [only] to the right of the 
school authorities to establish [necessary] regulations”). 
 31. See generally Larry D. Bartlett, Hair and Dress Codes Revisited, 33 EDUC. L. REP. 
7, 7–8 (1986); see also Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 59 (“The Supreme Court failed to 
decide a case involving more general student dress or appearance restrictions before those 
cases dried up due to the disappearance of such restrictions.”). 
 32. Alison Mitchell, Clinton Will Advise Schools on Uniforms, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 
1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/25/us/clinton-will-advise-schools-on-uniforms. 
html (“‘If it means that teen-agers will stop killing each other over designer jackets,’ the 
President said in his weekly radio address, ‘then our public schools should be able to require 
their students to require school uniforms. . . . If it means that the schoolrooms will be more 
orderly, more disciplined, . . . and that our young people will learn to evaluate themselves by 
what they are on the inside instead of what they’re wearing on the outside, then our public 
schools should be able to require their students to wear school uniforms.’”). 
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nation’s larger cultural commitment to solving societal problems through 
increased emphasis on “law and order,” zero tolerance policies, and 
punishment.33 The post-civil rights “law and order” era “spawned an entire 
culture oriented around the values . . . of policing,” and “law enforcement 
became the paradigm through which American society identified problems 
and conceptualized solutions.”34 Unsurprisingly, as this cultural shift 
produced a racially-tinged mass incarceration epidemic among adults, 
increasingly draconian and racially-tinged dress codes led to rapid increases 
in enforcement against children in public schools.35 
President Clinton twice advocated for school dress codes and uniform 
policies in successive State of the Union addresses, and officials in the 
Clinton Administration adopted policies encouraging the use of uniform 
policies and strict dress codes.36 A 1996 “Manual on School Uniforms” 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime 
Policy, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 230, 230 (2007); see also Ann Scott Tyson, Schools Fight 
Gang Colors by Pushing Uniform Gray, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 12, 1996), 
https://www.csmonitor.com/1996/0412/12031.html (describing use of armed police officers 
by one high school on the south side of Chicago to enforce dress designed to prevent 
students from wearing gang colors, even if the codes have a disproportionate impact on 
African American youth wearing designer basketball sneakers). 
 34. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 69; see also JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING 
THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND 
CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 3–5 (2009) (“Americans have built a new civil and political 
order structured around the problem of violent crime.”). 
 35. Weaver, supra note 33, at 230; see also Mark Peffley & Jon Hurwitz, The Racial 
Components of “Race-Neutral” Crime Policy Attitudes, 23 POL. PSYCHOL. 59, 67 (2002); 
Julia Azari, From Wallace to Trump, the Evolution of “Law and Order,” FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(Mar. 13, 2016, 5:41 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/from-wallace-to-trump-the-
evolution-of-law-and-order/ (“In the 1980s and 1990s, the politics of crime turned distinctly 
punitive and remained racially coded.”); Nadra Nittle, How Kids’ Obsession with Air 
Jordans Helped Lead to School Uniforms and Stricter Dress Codes, VOX (Oct. 10, 2018, 
4:50 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/10/10/17961124/air-jordans-sneaker-
violence-black-youth-school-dress-codes-school-uniforms (connecting declines in school 
dress codes in the early 1980s with a rise in conservative “preppy” dress that administrators 
found more appealing, and the concomitant rise in dress codes in the late 1980s with the 
increased popularity of basketball sneakers) (“The press largely painted sneakerheads as 
violent and materialistic[.]”). 
 36. President William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1996), 
https://clintonwhitehouse2.archives.gov/WH/New/other/sotu.html (“[O]ur public schools 
should be able to require their students to wear school uniforms.”); [Bill Clinton], 1997 State 
of the Union Address, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/states/docs/sou97.htm (“And we must continue to promote order and 
discipline; supporting communities that introduce school uniforms, impose curfews, enforce 
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published by the Department of Justice Office of Elementary and 
Secondary School Education37 explained in its second sentence that 
communities were adopting school uniform policies specifically “[i]n 
response to growing levels of violence in [American] schools.”38 
Remarking that a “safe and disciplined learning environment is the first 
requirement of a good school”39 (as opposed to a nurturing, stimulating, or 
intellectually challenging environment), the manual noted that strict dress 
codes offer the following benefits: 
$ decreasing violence and theft . . . among students over 
designer clothing and expensive sneakers; 
$ helping prevent gang members from wearing gang 
colors and insignia at school; 
$ instilling students with discipline; 
$ helping parents and students resist peer pressure; 
$ helping students concentrate on their school work; and 
$ helping school officials recognize intruders who come to 
the school.40 
Other Clinton administration guidelines regarding school dress codes 
reminded districts to respect religious and political expression and to avoid 
using unconstitutionally vague and overbroad language, but otherwise 
proceeded on the assumption that any dress code policy rationally 
connected to safety, discipline, or “helping students concentrate on their 
[school] work” would survive judicial scrutiny.41 That assumption appears 
to have proven correct in hindsight, as virtually all challenges to school 
dress code policies since that time—at least ones premised on broad, 
                                                                                                                 
truancy laws, remove disruptive students from the classroom, and have zero tolerance for 
guns and drugs in schools.”). 
 37. OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MANUAL ON 
SCHOOL UNIFORMS (1996), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED387947.pdf. The fact that this 
manual on educational dress was published by the Department of Justice and not the 
Department of Education further illustrates the punitive purposes behind dress code and 
uniform policies of the time. 
 38. Id. at 3. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.; see also Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 62. 
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constitutional rights to free expression and substantive autonomy—have 
failed.42 
The combination of presidential promotion and judicial permissiveness 
of school dress codes helped usher in the current era of pervasive dress 
code policies. “In the two decades since the Clinton administration 
encouraged American public schools to experiment with school uniforms 
and strict dress codes, such restrictions have become a common—though 
not quite omnipresent—feature of American public education.”43 Today, as 
many as sixty percent of all public school students attend schools with strict 
dress code policies, and another twenty-five percent wear school 
uniforms.44 Restrictions on, severity of, and legislative authorization to 
enforce dress codes vary widely across the country. At least twenty-two 
states expressly grant local school districts the power to establish dress 
codes, while school districts in other states do so with the tacit consent of 
the state.45 Some states, like Arkansas, have state-wide public school dress 
codes, portions of which specifically target only students with female 
anatomy.46 
These dress restrictive policies have faced several narrow legal 
challenges, but the few broad constitutional challenges “have run into a 
wall of judicial skepticism and have been rejected nearly uniformly, often 
without thorough consideration.”47 While many lower courts have rejected 
the Supreme Court’s early formulations that dress itself has protected 
expressive value, even courts willing to entertain free expression claims 
rarely require schools to provide support for their proffered justifications 
that dress policies are necessary.48 Particularly problematic, in the hyper-
                                                                                                                 
 42. See infra Part III. 
 43. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 61. 
 44. Id.; see also infra note 46. 
 45. See Zhou, supra note 4; see also Jocelyn Gecker, California City Is Latest to Redo 
“Sexist” School Dress Code, CBS DENVER (Sept. 19, 2018, 9:56 AM), 
https://denver.cbslocal.com/2018/09/19/sexist-dress-code-half-shirts-school/ (“Dress codes 
and their severity vary widely nationwide. Twenty-four states have policies that give local 
school districts the power to adopt their own dress codes or uniform policies, according to 
the Education Commission of the States, a nonprofit that tracks education policy.”). 
 46. Gecker, supra note 45 (explaining that Arkansas’ statewide policy requires districts 
“to prohibit the wearing of clothing that exposes underwear, buttocks, or the breast of a 
female”). 
 47. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 62. 
 48. Id. at 63; see also Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 388 (6th Cir. 
2005) (rejecting claim that clothing itself has any expressive content for First Amendment 
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sexualized gendered dress code context, courts rarely treat a district’s “lack 
of distraction” justification as anything other than self-evidently weighty,49 
or deserving of substantial deference as a matter of order, discipline, and 
pedagogy.50  
While the explicit enforcement of dress codes spans only a few decades, 
its recent addition to the school regulatory machinery springs from well-
entrenched and antiquated notions of feminine acquiescence to white, male, 
heteronormative, and inherently conservative uniformity. Originally 
justified as tools to create safe learning environments free from violence 
and distractions, these policies have more sinisterly manifested a 
fascination on gender in minor students. 
III. The Growing Obsession with Sex: Gendered 
(and “Gender Neutral”) Dress Codes 
“While research on dress codes remains inconclusive regarding the 
correlation between their implementation with students’ academic 
outcomes, many educators agree that they can serve an important purpose: 
helping insure a safe and comfortable learning environment . . . .”51 
Banning clearly disruptive attire like T-shirts with racial epithets or explicit 
language, or physically disruptive clothing like hats with built-in strobe 
lighting, promotes a productive learning environment by avoiding material 
and substantial disruptions.52 
But what is offensive and inappropriate? That answer can be difficult 
even with arguably racist symbols such as Confederate flags or “MAGA” 
                                                                                                                 
purposes unless the clothing “‘conveys a particular[ ] message’”) (quoting Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974))); Inturri v. City of Hartford, 365 F. Supp. 2d 240, 
245 (D. Conn. 2005) (observing plaintiffs’ concession that “their spider web tattoos are not 
conveying any speech or message, but merely are related to personal appearance”). 
 49. See, e.g., Blau, 401 F.3d at 397–98 (listing arguments in support of student dress 
restrictions and treating them as largely self-evident); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 
268 F.3d 275, 286 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Improving the educational process is undoubtedly an 
important and substantial interest of Forney and the school board.”).  
 50. See, e.g., Littlefield, 268 F.3d at 287 (“As has been well recognized, federal courts 
should defer to school boards to decide, within constitutional bounds, what constitutes 
appropriate behavior and dress in public schools.”).  
 51. Zhou, supra note 4; see also EDUC. P’SHIPS, INC., RESEARCH BRIEF: STUDENT DRESS 
CODES AND UNIFORMS (2009), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED537953.pdf.  
 52. Zhou, supra note 4. 
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hats.53 Moreover, the answer becomes much more subjective when one 
considers the “offensiveness” not of language but of one’s own body. 
Nevertheless, in recent years, supporters of strict public school dress 
restrictions have focused heavily on the “disruption” caused by the 
adolescent female body.54 Some argue that this increased focus derives 
from “complicated trends in sexuality and gender relations that have 
sexualized young women and girls of an ever-decreasing age.”55 But dress 
codes labeling girls’ bodies as “disruptive” because of their inherently 
sexual nature does the opposite of preventing sexualization, particularly 
when the codes punish those same young people for the power and dangers 
supposedly implicit in that imputed sexuality.56  
Numerous scholars have convincingly explained how media, advertising, 
and other influences have pressed upon both young women and men of all 
ages an inherently sexualized account of female adolescence.57 Some, like 
mass advertising critic Jean Kilbourne, have used this reality to justify strict 
“modesty-based” dress code bans.58 Kilbourne, author of the book So Sexy 
So Soon: The New Sexualized Childhood, has expressed the view that 
school dress codes help “take away some of the pressures that girls feel to 
don sexy outfits.”59  
                                                                                                                 
 53. Dave Urbanski, Law Professor Blasts Student’s MAGA Hat as “Undeniable Symbol 
of White Supremacy,” BLAZE (July 10, 2019), https://www.theblaze.com/news/law-
professor-blasts-students-maga-hat-as-undeniable-symbol-of-white-supremacy (quoting 
professor Jeffrey Omari, who claimed that a student’s “shiny red MAGA hat was like a siren 
spewing derogatory racial obscenities at me for the duration of the one hour and fifteen-
minute class”).  
 54. Hayley Krischer, Is Your Body Appropriate to Wear to School?, NY TIMES (Apr. 17, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/style/student-bra-nipples-school.html (recounting 
story of female high school student who declined to wear a bra to school because of a 
painful sunburn she suffered and who was forced by the administration to place Band-Aids 
on her nipples to remove any distraction her body might cause to other students). 
 55. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 76; see also Harbach, supra note 8, at 1044 
(suggesting that educators believe that simply obscuring the female body will diffuse sexual 
tension). 
 56. Zhou, supra note 4 (“[O]ne of the key concerns is the implication that women 
should be hypercognizant about their physical identity and how the world responds to it.”); 
Harbach, supra note 8, at 1044. 
 57. See Harbach, supra note 8, at 1042. 
 58. See generally DIANE E. LEVIN & JEAN KILBOURNE, SO SEXY SO SOON: THE NEW 
SEXUALIZED CHILDHOOD AND WHAT PARENTS CAN DO TO PROTECT THEIR KIDS (2008). 
 59. Ellen Friedrichs, 4 Lies About School Dress Codes That Cover Up Their Oppressive 
Effects, EVERYDAY FEMINISM (Dec. 11, 2014), https://everydayfeminism.com/2014/ 
12/school-dress-code-myths/ (“As [Kilbourne] said in an interview on the matter, ‘Girls 
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But imposing modesty-based dress restrictions on female students often 
is counterproductive. In fact, in many ways, such dress codes are actively 
harmful in institutionalizing myths about a girl’s inherent sexuality, the 
dangerousness of her body, and her responsibility to protect others from 
their own lurid sexual stares and advances. This harmful messaging 
reinforces the consent myth that provocative dress implies consent to be 
objectified, or worse. 
A. Obsessing Over Sex 
What Ms. Kilbourne and others promoting this pseudo-protective 
justification for dress codes often miss is that the enforcement of the dress 
code itself unnecessarily and harmfully injects sexualization into an 
otherwise innocent school day. In 2015, an elementary school in Houston 
sent home a five-year-old kindergarten student for wearing her favorite 
rainbow dress “‘because spaghetti straps are against the rules.’”60 This 
admittedly extreme example nevertheless highlights several problems with 
sex-obsessed dress codes. First, the facially gender neutral dress code at 
issue contained several provisions targeting clothing only sold for and worn 
by those who identify as female: Shirts could not expose the chest, 
midsection, or torso;61 skirts and sun dresses needed to be kept at mid-thigh 
length or longer;62 and cleavage and bra straps could not be shown.63 
Second, it defies common sense to suggest that a five-year-old girl’s 
sundress exposing her shoulders could possibly cause a “material and 
substantial disruption” to her classmates, most of whom are at least a 
decade away from becoming sexually mature and active. Instead, the 
enforcement of this implicitly gendered dress code required an adult 
administrator charged with protecting elementary school students to 
sexualize a five-year-old girl and remove her from her educational 
experience as a result.  
                                                                                                                 
these days are really pressured to dress in a very provocative way. All of their role models – 
celebrities and pop stars – dress that way. For them, sexy and attractive is defined in a very 
cliched and stereotypical way.’”). 
 60. Jef Rouner, The Apparently Immoral Shoulders of My Five-Year-Old Daughter, 
HOUS. PRESS (Apr. 22, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.houstonpress.com/arts/the-apparently-
immoral-shoulders-of-my-five-year-old-daughter-7372634.  
 61. CYPRESS-FAIRBANKS I.S.D., STUDENT HANDBOOK: 2019-2020, at 44 (2019), 
http://www.cfisd.net/download_file/517811526. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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Third, enforcing this dress code violation forced the parents of a five-
year-old girl to decide whether to have an honest yet premature 
conversation about sex and objectification of womens’ bodies or mislead 
their daughter when she asks why she had to leave school. This unnecessary 
injection of sex was only made possible because dress codes like those 
promoted by Ms. Kilbourne—ones purportedly designed to protect girls 
from sexual objectification—exist.64  
B. Consent Implications of Modesty-Based Dress Codes 
Gender-based critiques of school dress codes focus not only on explicitly 
gendered differences in such codes, but also on facially neutral codes that 
have a disproportionate impact on female students. These critiques draw 
public attention to the fact that most of the restrictions in public school 
dress codes apply exclusively or disproportionately to female attire.65 The 
stated (and implicit) purposes of these dress codes, the objectification of 
girls’ bodies required to enforce the codes, and the harmful disproportionate 
impact of these codes entrench and institutionalize myths around female 
body ownership and sexual consent at a dangerously young age. 
1. Stated and Implicit Purposes of Sex-Obsessed Dress Codes 
Modesty-based dress codes reinforce the message that girls’ bodies are 
inherently dangerous to men and boys, and that they are responsible for any 
unwanted attention they receive. Gendered dress codes ask girls “to curtail 
their self-expression not for their own benefit but for the benefit of young 
                                                                                                                 
 64. One particularly offensive Pennsylvania high school dress code reflects the failure 
of the strict dress code system to protect girls: 
Ladies: 
. . . . 
. . . Choose modest attire. No bellies showing, keep “the girls” covered and 
supported, and make sure that nothing is so small that all your bits and pieces 
are hanging out. Please remember as you select an outfit . . . that we don’t want 
to be looking at “sausage rolls” . . . . As you get dressed, remember that you 
can’t put 10 pounds of mud in a five-pound sack. 
Taylor Pittman, High School Dress Code Letter Advises Girls to Cover Their “Sausage 
Rolls,” HUFFPOST (May 29, 2015, 1:26 PM ET), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/biglerville-
high-school-dress-code-sausage-rolls_n_7463576.  
 65. Zhou, supra note 4; see also Galen Sherwin, 5 Things Public Schools Can and 
Can’t Do When It Comes to Dress Codes, ACLU (May 30, 2017, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-education/5-things-public-schools-
can-and-cant-do-when-it-comes.  
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men who are allegedly distracted by sharing public space with women.”66 
This “lack of distraction” rationale—that the uncovered bodies of female 
students are so disruptive that they impede male students’ ability to learn—
has been repeated numerous times by school administrators defending these 
codes.67 As one high school student told a reporter in 2017, “My principal 
constantly says that the main reason for it is to create a ‘distraction-free 
learning zone’ for our male counterparts.”68  
Even more troubling than the rationale itself, administrators fault not the 
male student who gazed sexually at a classmate and failed to pay attention 
in class; instead, “the girl he was distracted by holds all the 
responsibility.”69 This messaging—that girls are responsible for the lurid 
and sexual temptations of boys—institutionalizes the corrosive notion that 
girls’ “bodies are always sexualized and bad, and that they must cover them 
up to appear decent.”70 It diminishes and shames a part of someone’s 
personhood—the body—of which growing girls and boys should be proud, 
teaching girls that, to at least half of the world’s population, their bodies are 
both (1) dangerous, and (2) the only thing most men and boys see.71 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 99. 
 67. Emily Miller, Dress Code Sexism, HER CAMPUS (Apr. 24, 2017, 11:50 PM), 
https://www.hercampus.com/school/akron/dress-code-sexism (“Dress codes are enforced for 
the comfort and ‘lack of distraction’ for male students. Girl[s’] bodies apparently pose an 
inconvenience for the teenage boy. If not properly covered, a male student might become so 
entranced with a female student’s shoulder that he could completely miss out on all the 
information in class. And whose fault is that? According to schools, the girl he was 
distracted by holds all the responsibility.”). 
 68. Zhou, supra note 4 (“[A] group of high-school girls from South Orange, New 
Jersey . . . launched a campaign last fall, #IAmMoreThanADistraction, which exploded into 
a trending topic on Twitter and gleaned thousands of responses from girls sharing their own 
experiences.”). 
 69. Miller, supra note 67; see also Zhou, supra note 4 (“[M]any districts across the 
country . . . justify female-specific rules with that logic, and effectively, . . . place the onus 
on girls to prevent inappropriate reactions from their male classmates.”). 
 70. Miller, supra note 67; see also Catherine McCall, The Sexualization of Women and 
Girls, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 4, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/ 
overcoming-child-abuse/201203/the-sexualization-women-and-girls (explaining the 
psychological consequences of sexualizing girls in school). 
 71. Friedrichs, supra note 59 (“[A]ny confidence and pride she might take in her 
appearance is automatically stripped from her when she is told that she is dressing 
inappropriately.”); see also Zhou, supra note 4 (“‘The dress code makes girls feel self-
conscious, ashamed, and uncomfortable in their own bodies.’”). And by placing blame on 
the female student for tempting boys with their bodies, schools institutionalize the message 
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Obsessing over girls’ bodies in student dress codes harmfully places the 
focus on physical appearance over physical abilities, mental capabilities, or 
emotional development, perpetuating the troubling message that women 
exist for the consumption of society.72  
“Educators and sociologists, too, have argued that dress codes grounded 
in such logic amplify a broader societal expectation: that women are the 
ones who need to protect themselves from unwanted attention and that 
those wearing what could be considered sexy clothing are ‘asking for’ a 
response.”73 One sociologist concluded that “dress codes normalize certain 
forms of girlhood, problematize others, and suggest girls’ responsibility for 
the school’s moral climate.”74 
This rationale also communicates harmful and dangerous methods to 
both boys and girls regarding consent. It tells boys that it is “the girl’s 
responsibility to cover up, and if she doesn’t it’s her fault he got 
distracted.”75 It gives carte blanche for boys to lean into the myth that “they 
are incapable of controlling their own urges.”76 Conversely, it tells girls that 
they are responsible for preventing this irresistible urge of the opposite sex, 
and that it is their fault for dressing so provocatively if boys gaze, leer, 
whistle, catcall, or touch. As one dress code critic noted, this approach 
serves as a microcosm of “‘a culture that’s so used to looking at issues of 
harassment and assault through the wrong end of the telescope,’” directed at 
“‘girls’ own clothing’” rather than the kind of sexually predatory behavior 
directed at girls.77 Or, as another critic put it more bluntly, “[r]ather than 
teaching boys that looking up girls’ skirts is wrong—no matter how 
                                                                                                                 
that the only truly relevant part of the girl’s personhood is a dangerous weapon that must be 
kept under wraps. Id. 
 72. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 99 (contending that gendered dress codes tell girls 
that “[t]heir permission to enter the public space is conditioned on acquiescence to a state-
sanctioned gaze that draws attention to their bodies and conceptualizes them as potential 
sexual objects rather than equal members of a learning community”). 
 73. Zhou, supra note 4. 
 74. Friedrichs, supra note 59. 
 75. Miller, supra note 67. 
 76. Id.; see also Zhou, supra note 4 (“Often they report hearing phrases like, ‘boys will 
be boys,’ from teachers.”); Mieke Eerkens, When Judges Assume That Men Cannot Control 
Their Own Sexual Urges, ATLANTIC (July 17, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
sexes/archive/2013/07/when-judges-assume-that-men-cannot-control-their-own-sexual-
urges/277880/ (recalling Iowa Supreme Court case upholding dismissal of female employee 
because her male employer found her too irresistibly attractive). 
 77. Zhou, supra note 4. 
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convenient the angle might be—they enforce a rule that punishes a high 
school girl for being sexualized by her peers.”78 
This distorted view of responsibility holds obvious and disturbing 
parallels in criminal sexual assault cases. School dress codes tell girls that 
their permission to enter public school is conditioned on an adult’s 
determination that those around her can control themselves.79 And this 
entire narrative reinforces scripts and assumptions about gender and 
sexuality that misplace responsibility for sexual violence on its victims.80 
2. Objectification and Enforcement 
The enforcement of these modesty-based dress codes requires the literal 
gaze of adult school officials (mostly male81) who are required to view 
young women sexually in order to assess their compliance with dress 
restrictions. In other words, dress codes designed to prevent sexualization 
of girls require the very type of objectification the rules are purportedly 
designed to prevent.82 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Miller, supra note 67; see also Rebecca Klein, High School Student Accuses School 
of “Shaming Girls for Their Bodies” With Dress Code, HUFFPOST (June 2, 2014, 1:52 PM 
ET), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/lindsey-stocker-dress-code_n_5432687 (explaining 
that one Quebec high school student hung a sign stating, “‘Don’t humiliate her because she 
is wearing shorts. It’s hot outside. Instead of shaming girls for their bodies, teach boys that 
girls are not sexual objects’”). 
 79. Friedrichs, supra note 59 (“[This view] assumes that the sexualization is the fault of 
the girl, and not the person sexualizing her.”) Since “[a] teen may simply be trying to dress 
fashionabl[y],” the fault ought to lie with the adult sexualizing her. Id. 
 80. See Miller, supra note 67 (“This plays right into rape culture. . . . What is a question 
that is so commonly and despicably asked in rape cases? You guessed it: ‘What was she 
wearing?’”). 
 81. Robert Maranto et al., Boys Will Be Superintendents: School Leadership as a 
Gendered Profession, PHI DELTA KAPPAN (Sept. 24, 2018), https://kappanonline.org/ 
maranto-carroll-cheng-teodoro-school-leadership-gender/ (“[U]sing data on more than 7,500 
public school principals from the U.S. Department of Education 2011-12 Schools and 
Staffing Survey and additional published sources, we recently found that while 90% of 
elementary teachers are women, only 66% of elementary principals are women. In secondary 
schools, meanwhile, women make up 63% of teachers but just 48% of principals.”).  
 82. Friedrichs, supra note 59 (“Really, claiming that dress codes prevent ‘sexualization’ 
of girls seems more like a paternalistic excuse given by people who are uncomfortable 
admitting that some teen girls may choose to express their sexuality through their 
appearance, or by others who themselves draw sexual conclusions about teens in certain 
outfits.”); see also Suzannah Weiss, 5 Ways School Dress Codes Reinforce Rape Culture, 
Because Women Aren’t a “Distraction,” BUSTLE (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.bustle. 
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The enforcement of dress code violations by men through a 
predominantly male lens as a result of predominantly male sexualization 
parallels troublingly with the experience of criminal sexual assault victims. 
Women reporting their own rapes and sexual assaults to police officers 
regularly express frustration with the “credibility discount” they encounter 
from predominantly male police officers in believing their stories.83 A 2016 
Department of Justice report on the prosecution of sex crimes in the United 
States found substantial and pervasive problems with male police officers 
expressing skepticism about the veracity of rape allegations.84 In addition, 
even when cases do make it to court, judges continue to express confusion 
regarding consent.85 
Just as male-centric enforcement of a minor female’s dress misplaces 
responsibility for the sexualization of young girls and misrepresents the 
notion of consent to sexual attention, criminal sexual assault adjudication 
utilizes archaic societal attitudes about “sexual autonomy and gender roles 
in sexual relations.”86 When school administrators communicate that girls 
are responsible for any sexual attention they may receive from their 
classmates or teachers, it should come as little surprise that “jurors, 
                                                                                                                 
com/articles/143604-5-ways-school-dress-codes-reinforce-rape-culture-because-women-
arent-a-distraction. 
 83. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility 
Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33 (2017) (“The typical law enforcement investigation is 
guilt-presumptive (and potentially problematic for that reason). In sexual assault cases, this 
presumption is flipped.”). 
 84. Soraya Chemaly, How Police Still Fail Rape Victims, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 16, 
2016, 8:29 PM ET), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/how-police-still-fail-rape-
victims-w434669 (“One officer in the [Baltimore P.D.] sex crimes unit explained, ‘In 
homicide, there are real victims; all our rape cases are bullshit.’”).  
 85. See Shawn E. Fields, Debunking the Stranger-in-the-Bushes Myth: The Case for 
Sexual Assault Protection Orders, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 429, 441 (2017) (recalling rape case in 
which one judge asked a nineteen-year-old victim who was raped over a bathroom sink, 
“Why couldn’t you just keep your knees together? . . . Why didn’t you just sink your bottom 
down into the basin so he couldn’t penetrate you? . . . If you were frightened, you could have 
screamed.”). “Judge Camp also wondered aloud during the trial ‘why she allowed the sex to 
happen if she didn’t want it,’ and that ‘she certainly had the ability, perhaps learnt from her 
experience on the streets, to tell (him) to f--- off.’” Id. (alterations in original). 
 86. Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty 
Years of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 468 (2005). 
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prosecutors and police are confused about the boundary line between sex 
and rape.”87 
3. The Disproportionate Impact on Female Students 
Modesty-based dress codes subject young women “to more specific 
limitations on their expression than young men. They are required to spend 
more time and emotional energy on ensuring compliance with state 
appearance standards than young men.”88 This reality tangibly harms girls’ 
educations at rates disproportionate to their male counterparts, and once 
again communicates that girls and women are less deserving of the 
resources available in the public domain than boys and men. 
Consider the following common dress code provision: “Clothing and 
accessories must not be disruptive to teaching and learning. . . . [N]o low-
cut blouses, tube/halter tops, midriff tops. No short-shorts, mini-skirts. All 
shorts/skirts must be at relaxed hand level. . . . No visible undergarments.”89 
This facially neutral dress code restricts clothing in a way that functionally 
affects only girls. “Boys shorts are made longer, their tank tops have thicker 
straps, and they have no bra straps or cleavage to hide.”90  
These gendered dress codes, even if facially neutral, have the effect of 
“focus[ing] a disproportionate amount of female students’ attention on 
policing their own appearance and sexuality.”91 At Tottenville High School 
on Staten Island, a study found that its dress code banning clothes like tank 
tops and mini-skirts led to over one hundred disciplinary actions per 
month—with more than ninety percent of those actions taken against girls.92 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Fields, supra note 85, at 441 (quoting Seidman & Vickers, supra note 86, at 468) 
(“The vast majority of people—including law enforcement personnel, judges and potential 
jurors—remain conflicted about what constitutes ‘consensual’ sex. They are ambivalent 
about placing criminal sanctions on ‘non-violent’ sexual assault or, for that matter, anything 
short of violent penetration that results in physical injuries.”). 
 88. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 99; Miller, supra note 67 (“Policies are almost 
always directed strictly toward girls; some even specify for girls only.”). 
 89. TOTTENVILLE HIGH SCH., FAMILY STUDENT HANDBOOK 32 (2014), https://web. 
archive.org/web/20150322064140/http://www.tottenvillehs.net/www/ud00/6/6baff98e0b934
e299f3d3025021920bd/Personal_Documents/Family.Student%20Handbook%202014.pdf.  
 90. Miller, supra note 67 (“Dress codes are clearly written for girls. No one is 
monitoring the length of any guy’s cargo shorts, but someone is always watching for a dress 
that comes up a little too short.”). 
 91. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 104.  
 92. Ryan Broderick, This High School’s “Sexist” Dress Code Has Caused 200 
Detentions in Just the Last Two Weeks, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 16, 2014, 12:50 PM ET), 
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The disruption and humiliation attendant with enforcing these dress 
codes also bear mention. “Frequently, students are openly called out in the 
middle of class, told to leave and change, and sometimes, to go home and 
find a more appropriate outfit. In some instances, girls must wear brightly 
colored shirts that can exacerbate the embarrassment, emblazoned with 
words like ‘Dress Code Violator.’”93 In short, “who has to dress a certain 
way to make sure their body is covered? Who will be asked to change if 
they don’t follow this rule? Who will be taken out of class or even sent 
home if their clothes are deemed to be too distracting? Girls.”94 
The purpose, enforcement, and disproportionate impact of modesty-
based dress codes all institutionalize harmful myths and stereotypes that 
almost uniformly hurt young girls. “They are grounded in patriarchal 
assumptions about the dangers of the female body [and] the primacy of 
male claims to public space and services . . . .”95 They reinforce the false 
narrative that women are responsible for protecting themselves and altering 
their behavior to serve male interests, and they highlight the “state’s 
unwillingness to take responsibility for protecting women from physical 
and sexual assault.”96  
C. Legal Challenges to Sex-Obsessed Dress Codes 
While the primary purpose of this Article is not to lay groundwork for 
new legal challenges to school dress, it bears reflecting on recent failed 
attempts to challenge sex-obsessed dress codes on constitutional and Title 
IX grounds. These failures, in the face of compelling arguments, reinforce 
the unwillingness of state and federal district courts to take seriously the 
threats to girls and women through patriarchal institutions like gendered 
dress codes. 
Broad-based challenges to dress codes have focused on substantive due 
process rights to autonomy, First Amendment rights to free expression, 
                                                                                                                 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanhatesthis/tottenville-high-school-dress-for-
success. 
 93. Zhou, supra note 4 (“‘That’s crazy they’re caring more about two inches of a girl’s 
thigh being shown than them being in class.’”). 
 94. Miller, supra note 67 (“Because a female student’s body might pose a distraction to 
a male student’s education, her education is interrupted and put on hold until she can find 
something more suitable for the classroom.”). 
 95. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 104. 
 96. Id. 
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Equal Protection challenges based on gender, and Title IX challenges as 
applied to disruptions to female education. 
1. Substantive Due Process  
Modern substantive due process formulations consider the zone of 
individual autonomy to which individuals deserve protection absent 
overriding state justification. As decisions within the zone of autonomy 
become more personal, important, and central to the development of 
individual identity, government action requires a more substantial 
justification. Some decisions, according to modern Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, are made free from the “compulsion of the State.”97  
The importance of dressing oneself as a decision worthy of constitutional 
autonomous protection has undergone significant redefinition since Tinker. 
While courts throughout the 1970s acknowledged the importance of dress 
and presentation as a central component of individual liberty,98 more recent 
decisions blithely refer to students’ right to “look nice” or wear clothes they 
“feel good in.”99 For example, in a leading case from the Sixth Circuit, the 
court trivialized a student’s substantive due process claim as resting on a 
purported right to wear blue jeans rather than any truly important liberty 
interest worthy of constitutional protection.100 
This liberty interest, when framed so narrowly, is doomed to give way to 
the admittedly important interest of public educators to provide a safe and 
productive learning environment for the nation’s children. But the showing 
required for this government justification has undergone radical 
transformation since Tinker as well. As discussed previously, courts in the 
immediate wake of Tinker read that decision as requiring an actual showing 
by the government—through empirical evidence or otherwise—not only 
that a proposed dress code action was rationally related to the stated 
objective but actually did further that objective.101 This stringent 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“At the heart of liberty is 
the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of life.”). 
 98. See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1st Cir. 1970) (finding “within 
the commodious concept of liberty” the right to “wear one’s hair as he wishes”) (“The 
Founding Fathers wrote an amendment for speech and assembly; even they did not deem it 
necessary to write an amendment for personal appearance.”). 
 99. Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 388–89 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 100. Id. at 389. 
 101. See, e.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075–76 (8th Cir. 1971) (rejecting 
school dress code policy that was not necessary “to carry out the educational mission of . . . 
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requirement led, at first, to judicial override of hair length codes, and later, 
to the decline in school dress codes generally.102 
Contemporary courts take a far different approach, accepting at face 
value the bare assertions of schools that dress codes further the various 
goals of order, discipline, safety, and fostering a productive learning 
environment.103 While granting deference to the expertise of school 
administrators in choosing how best to operate their schools may make 
sense, limits to that deference must exist. Some less inherently problematic 
dress code policies, such as prohibitions on clothing with cartoon 
characters, may help foster a less distracting learning environment for 
younger children. But courts should require at least a minimal showing that 
such a prohibition is required. That scrutiny should be all the more exacting 
when the policy at issue directly or indirectly affects a group of students on 
the basis of sex or gender. Indeed, the entire body of our liberty-based due 
process jurisprudence rests on the ability of the Court to probe the 
importance of a stated government objective and the connection of that 
objective to the challenged action. Those limits appear lacking in the school 
dress code context. 
2. First Amendment 
Broad First Amendment challenges to school dress codes have also 
failed, but for slightly different reasons. One reason concerns the ambiguity 
in First Amendment jurisprudence itself regarding nonverbal expression. 
First Amendment law recognizes that the freedom of expression 
encompasses a wide variety of conduct intended to communicate political 
and social ideas. Here, the conduct of “styling one’s appearance and 
determining how to present oneself for public consumption in a public 
school setting is inherently richly communicative.”104  
                                                                                                                 
the school”); see also Stevenson v. Bd. of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(upholding hair length restriction only after school provided evidence of disruption in the 
classroom arising from hair length). 
 102. See Richards, 424 F.2d at 1286. 
 103. See Blau, 401 F.3d at 392 (upholding school dress code when only evidence 
presented was “affidavits from three teachers who agreed that the dress code had a positive 
impact on the Highlands learning environment”). 
 104. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 102; see also G. Q. Vicary, The Signs of Clothing, 
in CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES IN NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION 291, 299 (Fernando 
Poyatos ed., 1988) (“Clothing is basic to definition of self. It is impossible to discuss 
clothing, even as distant history, and ignore disquieting inner questions such as ‘what do the 
clothes I am wearing say about me?’”).  
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However, courts have expressed confusion over the extent to which the 
First Amendment covers such generalized expression as “dress,” or whether 
it covers it at all.105 As recently explained by academics,106 the source of the 
confusion appears to be whether the type of nuanced messaging in self-
styling is itself a source for protection under the Free Speech Clause, or 
whether the styling is merely connected to other values protected by the 
First Amendment.107  
To the extent courts have been forced to decide this issue, they have 
uniformly rejected First Amendment challenges to broad dress codes. Much 
of the reasoning appears again connected to the narrow framing of what 
self-styling actually means to a child as a form of expression, which itself 
renders it less deserving of protection in the face of countervailing 
government objectives.108 It remains to be seen how the analysis might 
change if a court with a more expansive view of the communicative nature 
of dress faces this issue. 
3. Equal Protection 
Perhaps more relevant to the subject of this Article are gender-based 
challenges under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Dress codes with explicitly gendered differences are 
automatically suspect and require an “exceedingly persuasive justification” 
to withstand constitutional challenge.109 These codes are subjected to the 
Court’s intermediate scrutiny framework, requiring that the gender 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 103. 
 106. See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, ALAN K. CHEN & JOSEPH BLOCHER, FREE SPEECH 
BEYOND WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2017). 
 107. See id. at 34–41 (detailing these free speech arguments as related to instrumental 
music, which is another form of nonverbal self-styling). 
 108. Blau, 401 F.3d at 391 (doubting whether the desire to dress oneself generally 
garners First Amendment protection, but nonetheless rejecting the claim because of the 
existence of “important governmental interests” such as “bridg[ing] socio-economic 
differences between families,” “focus[ing] attention on learning,” [and] “enhanc[ing] school 
safety”); Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 285–86 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(assuming “without deciding that the First Amendment applies to expressive conduct 
implicated in the mandatory Uniform Policy,” but upholding the policy because “improving 
the educational process is undoubtedly an important and substantial interest”). 
 109. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (holding that government 
actions that facially classify on gender violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the 
government can provide an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for gender-specific 
action). 
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classification (1) serve “important governmental objectives” and (2) be 
“substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”110 
Many school dress codes—including those discussed in this Article—are 
so poorly written and facially discriminatory that they would likely fail 
under a straightforward application of this test. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has regularly expressed skepticism with “regulatory regimes that impose 
broad, differential burdens on the civil participation of women . . . [and] for 
the ad hoc justifications states use to rationalize such regimes.”111 
Surprisingly few Equal Protection challenges have been brought against 
explicitly gendered dress codes, but one such challenge recently succeeded 
in North Carolina. In Peltier v. Charter Day School,112 three students sued a 
charter school, challenging a policy that required girls to wear “skirts, 
skorts, or jumpers” and prohibited them from wearing shorts or pants.113 
The students argued that the policy “subject[ed] them to archaic stereotypes 
about what constitutes appropriate behavior and conduct for girls.”114 In 
turn, the students maintained that the code “reinforc[ed] the notion that 
girls, but not boys, must dress and behave modestly, that they are less 
physically active than boys and that they should behave and dress in a 
manner that is otherwise traditionally considered appropriately 
feminine.”115  
The court observed that “the caselaw in this specific area is not well 
developed,” acknowledging that most “dress code cases are claims based on 
the First Amendment.”116 Further, the court acknowledged that “[c]ourts 
traditionally have and should refrain from regulating the day-to-day issues 
presented in local schools.”117 However, the court ultimately found that the 
skirt requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause: 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 
(1976). 
 111. Ahrens & Siegel, supra note 7, at 104; see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 557 (“Virginia . . . 
has closed [VMI] to its daughters and, instead, has devised for them a ‘parallel program’ 
with faculty less impressively credentialed and less well paid, more limited course offerings, 
fewer opportunities for military training and for scientific specialization.”). 
 112. 384 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D.N.C. 2019). 
 113. Id. at 584. 
 114. Erin Buzuvis, Title IX Dress Code Case Survives Motion to Dismiss, TITLE IX BLOG 
(Apr. 4, 2017, 9:24 AM), https://title-ix.blogspot.com/2017/04/title-ix-dress-code-case-
survives.html (quoting complaint). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Peltier, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 595–96. 
 117. Id. at 595. 
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While this court recognizes that certain sex-differentiated 
standards consistent with community norms may be permissible, 
the skirts requirement in this case is not consistent with 
community norms. Women (and girls) have, for at least several 
decades, routinely worn both pants and skirts in various settings, 
including professional settings and school settings. Females have 
been allowed to wear trousers or pants in all but the most formal 
or conservative settings since the 1970s. . . . [M]ost public 
school dress codes across the country allowed girls to wear pants 
or shorts by the mid-1980s. . . . [C]ommunity standards which 
may account for the differences in standards applied to men and 
women, girls and boys, do not remain fixed in perpetuity. 
 While defendants argue the skirts requirement is based on the 
traditional values approach of the school as a whole and is in 
place to instill discipline and keep order, defendants have shown 
no connection between these stated goals and the requirement 
that girls wear skirts.118 
This hopeful ruling certainly represents a step in the right direction, but it 
also rested on the explicitly gendered nature of the dress code. Most school 
dress codes are facially neutral as to gender, even if they work in form and 
function to target and are disproportionately enforced against girls. Lacking 
explicit discrimination, any Equal Protection challenge will require proof of 
purposeful sex discrimination to succeed.119 That evidentiary showing is 
difficult, complicated, and in the area of sex discrimination, rarely 
successful.120 
  
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. at 596. 
 119. See Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274–75 (1979) (analogizing race-
discrimination cases to find that a law having a disparate impact on a historically 
disadvantaged gender group did not violate the constitution absent a showing of purposeful 
discrimination). 
 120. See Mary Anne Case, The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns: Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1466 (1999); 
see also Long v. Bd. of Educ., 121 F. Supp. 2d 621, 627–28 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (subjecting the 
school’s imposition of a sex-neutral, uniform-type dress code to the Feeney test and finding 
the code was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of ensuring student safety and 
fostering school order). 
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4. Title IX 
Absent evidence of purposeful sex discrimination, Title IX claims 
against facially neutral school dress codes could, theoretically, provide 
relief. Title IX provides: “No person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”121 Unlike Equal Protection challenges to facially 
neutral government action, plaintiffs bringing Title IX claims can “show[ ] 
that a facially neutral practice has a disparate impact” to carry their prima 
facie burden.122 However, the government can rebut that prima facie 
showing “by proving a business or educational necessity for the practice,” 
which may foreclose relief for plaintiffs suing school districts in courts that 
grant substantial deference to amorphous justifications such as order, 
discipline, and preventing distractions.123  
The larger hurdle, at least currently, appears to be the Department of 
Education. In Peltier, the same court that granted plaintiffs summary 
judgment on their Equal Protection claim granted defendants summary 
judgment on their Title IX claim.124 In doing so, the court cited recent 
administrative guidance from the Department of Education that Title IX 
permits “issues involving codes of personal appearance [to] be resolved at 
the local level.”125 It is important to note, however, that this setback came in 
a case bringing a facial challenge to a gendered dress code. As empirical 
evidence such as that highlighted in this Article becomes more prevalent 
regarding the disproportionately adverse impacts such dress codes have on 
female education, an as-applied challenge in the Title IX context may have 
greater chances of success in the future. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 121. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018). 
 122. Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1229–30 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Peltier v. Charter Day School, 384 F. Supp. 2d 579, 590 (E.D.N.C. 2019). 
 125. Id. at 589–90 (internal quotation omitted) (“Title IX does not directly speak to the 
‘precise question’ of school uniform policies or appearance codes, suggesting that Congress 
left this matter to the agency’s discretion. Additionally, in thirty-five years, Congress has 
never overridden ED’s interpretation of the statute. ED has provided an answer, interpreting 
Title IX to ‘permit[] issues involving codes of personal appearance to be resolved at the 
local level.’”).  
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IV. Institutions, Messaging, and Consent 
The foregoing discussion highlights the parallels between the shaming 
and victim-blaming central to enforcement of sexualized dress code policies 
and the shaming and victim-blaming so often central to rape and sexual 
assault adjudications. Just as a girl’s choice of clothing is scrutinized for 
sexual communication to those around her in determining whether she has 
invited “distracting” attention, a sexual violence victim’s clothing is 
scrutinized for sexual communication to the perpetrator to determine 
whether she impliedly invited the altercation. This is evident by the 
question “what was she wearing?”, which remains a part of the defense 
attorney’s lexicon in rape cases, and one can hardly blame the attorney 
when judges and juries remain persuaded that a rape victim’s fashion 
choices are relevant to the issue of consent.126 
This concluding Part explores the implications of that parallel more 
directly with respect to certain pervasive, troubling myths in criminal 
sexual assault adjudication: (A) the notion of implied general consent to 
sexual activity (or, framed differently, the false narrative of “worthiness” in 
prosecution); (B) the myth of the perfect victim; and (C) the myth of the 
unstoppable male. 
A. Implied General Consent to Sexual Contact 
Many modesty-based dress code critics observe that girls often wear 
short skirts or spaghetti straps simply to stay cool or because the clothing is 
fashionable, not to appear sexy.127 Undoubtedly, that is true. But one should 
ask a more basic question here: what if high school girls want to feel and 
look sexy? What, exactly, is wrong with that level of self-expression and 
agency? If we want girls (and boys) to be confident in their own skin, to 
feel proud of their own identities and individuality, to have positive body 
images, then what precisely is inappropriate about a girl choosing to feel 
and look sexy? 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Hannah Brenner, Kathleen Darcy, Gina Fedock & Sheryl Kubiak, Bars to Justice: 
The Impact of Rape Myths on Women in Prison, 17 GEO J. GENDER & L. 521, 540 (2016) 
(explaining that questions designed to perpetuate the rape myth that a woman was “asking 
for it” based on her behavior include “Was she drinking alcohol or using drugs at the time of 
the assault?” “What was she wearing?” and “Was she walking alone?”). 
 127. Klein, supra note 78 (showing picture of a makeshift sign posted outside of a school 
classroom, stating in part, “It’s hot outside. Instead of shaming girls for their bodies, teach 
boys that girls are not sexual objects.”). 
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The answer, apparently, is that expressing oneself sexually may attract 
attention, for which the one expressing herself must be held accountable. 
Rather than acknowledging that a girl can dress how she wants and others 
are responsible for their own responses, schools preemptively shut down 
that form of confident self-expression because other people may respond 
inappropriately.128 
To put a finer point on it, a school-age girl may in fact want to dress 
provocatively to attract attention from a particular person, be it a boyfriend 
or girlfriend, or simply a love interest. Inviting a consensual response from 
that singular individual, however, does not mean that she has granted 
general consent to all people in the public sphere. Dressing oneself is the 
responsibility of that person; the response to that dress is everyone else’s 
responsibility, and nothing about the nature of one’s dress does or can grant 
implied general consent to make sexual advances.  
Likewise, a woman has every right to dress provocatively (i.e., “don sexy 
outfits”129) in public with the purpose of attracting attention and, perhaps, a 
sexual companion. Her clothing may even communicate that desire, as 
dress is inherently communicative and expressive.130 But just because the 
general public can see that communication does not mean the person 
wearing those clothes has granted implied general consent for all to make 
sexual advances. So often lacking in public discourse around dress and 
consent is the basic fundamental recognition that a person’s dress cannot, 
by itself, communicate consent for anyone to do anything. There simply 
exists no general implied consent to engage sexually or otherwise with a 
sexily dressed woman. Neither does there exist any specific implied consent 
for a particular person to engage sexually with a sexily dressed woman, 
even if that woman has consented to converse or otherwise interact with 
that person.131  
These basic premises should be noncontroversial; as formulated, they 
likely are. But they also contradict the messaging behind placing 
responsibility on the girl to dress modestly, lest she arouse a response from 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See supra Part II. 
 129. Friedrichs, supra note 59.  
 130. See Vicary, supra note 104, at 323. 
 131. Cf. H.M. Malm, The Ontological Status of Consent and Its Implications for the Law 
on Rape, 2 LEGAL THEORY 147, 148 (1996) (exploring various societal understandings of 
“implied” or “tacit” consent as “consent given by refraining from an act rather than 
performing an act,” but admonishing against applying a sliding scale of tacit consent too 
easily in high-stakes situations like rape). 
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a boy. That messaging institutionalizes the notion that, even if the girl who 
wore short shorts did not specifically want boys to stare at her and make 
lewd comments, she impliedly “asked for it” because she “should have 
known better” than to dress that way. Similarly, when a rape investigation 
focuses on whether the victim’s dress was “too provocative”—or, for that 
matter, whether she was “out too late,”132 “in the wrong part of town,”133 or 
too “intoxicated”134—it communicates that she impliedly “asked for it” 
because she “should have known better.”135 
Therefore, to disrupt the notion that it is proper to project general implied 
consent onto any individual based on how they are dressed, reformers must 
look to the source of this belief—early-life modesty-focused dress codes—
and rectify the message it sends. 
B. The Perfect Victim 
At its core, these victim-blaming messages communicate a societal 
judgment that girls and women who behave in a certain way are less 
deserving of protection from sexual violence because they engage in 
behavior of which we disapprove. Some express this disapproval through 
the lens of burden sharing and risk prevention.136 Women ought to take 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Jessica Valenti, In Rape Tragedies, the Shame Is Ours, NATION (Apr. 17, 2013), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/rape-tragedies-shame-ours/ (“[W]henever we 
blame a woman for being attacked—when we speculate about what she was wearing, 
suggest she shouldn't have been drinking or that she stayed out too late—we’re making the 
world safer for rapists.”). 
 133. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 254–55 
(1975) (“Women have been raped by men . . . for behavior no more provocative than 
walking down the wrong road at night in the wrong part of town . . . .”). 
 134. Valenti, supra note 132. 
 135. State v. Neal, 120 P.3d 366, 374 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005) (summarizing trial court 
transcript in rape case in which defense counsel wondered aloud if rape victim “should have 
known better when she was at the Kwik Shop, because by that time Patrick Neal was already 
putting his hands on her”). 
 136. See, e.g., Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of Hooters 
Restaurant for Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 163, 167 
(1997) (explaining a “risk acceptance theory of non-liability” for women who dress 
provocatively and are later sexually harassed); Kelly C. Timmons, Hooters: Should There Be 
an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment 
Claims, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1123–24 (1995) (suggesting that “dress[ing] provocatively” 
demonstrates an assumption of risk that harassment might follow); cf. Joshua Burstein, 
Testing the Strength of Title VII Sexual Harassment Protection: Can It Support a Hostile 
Work Environment Claim Brought by a Nude Dancer, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
271, 307–08 (1998) (discussing consent-based defenses such as perceived “welcomeness” 
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simple safety precautions (that men do not have to take), make smarter 
decisions (expending mental energy not required of men), or not put 
themselves “in the wrong place at the wrong time” (places and times that 
are not off limits to men). In short, women ought to work diligently not to 
get raped.137  
This type of victim-blaming mentality derives from the myth of the 
“perfect victim,”138 the pure, virginal, modest woman who did nothing to 
                                                                                                                 
stemming from nonverbal cues like dress). 
 137. See, e.g., Charlotte Hilton Andersen, How to Teach Girls How Not to Get Raped, 
GREAT FITNESS EXPERIMENT (Jan. 10, 2013, 10:15 AM), http://www.thegreatfitness 
experiment.com/2013/01/how-to-teach-girls-how-not-to-get-raped.html (describing a self-
defense class in a which the teacher told young girls to report any attempted assault or rape 
“[b]ecause if you don't report it—what if your best friend comes walking along that same 
path 2 weeks later and gets raped? If you don't report it then it's your fault if other girls get 
hurt,” and offering suggestions for teaching prevention of sexual assault in ways that would 
not shift responsibility to victims); KATHERINE ANNE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, 
FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS 9 (1993) (describing the first week of college for a female 
student, where “there are fliers and counselors and videotapes telling us how not to get AIDS 
and how not to get raped, where not to wander and what signals not to send”); cf. Zerlina 
Maxwell, Stop Telling Women How to Not Get Raped, EBONY (Jan. 14, 2012), https://www. 
ebony.com/news/stop-telling-women-how-to-not-get-raped/ (“No more ad campaigns and 
public service announcements targeted at women to teach them how to avoid rape. . . . We 
need anti-rape campaigns that target young men and boys.”); Chris Linder, Telling Women 
How Not to Get Raped Won’t Stop Sexual Violence on Campus, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2018, 
2:30 PM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/2018/aug/02/ 
telling-women-how-not-to-get-raped-wont-stop-sexual-violence-on-campus (recommending 
that universities shift focus from sobering statistics about how many women are sexually 
assaulted and “teaching [those] women how not to get raped” to the fact that “one in 10 men 
studying at university have committed sexual violence” and “teaching [those] perpetrators 
not to rape”). 
 138. This use of the phrase “perfect victim” does not refer to the mythical “perfect rape 
victim” who responds to unwanted sexual advances in the manner preferred by judges and 
juries—by screaming, offering forcible physical and verbal resistance, and by immediately 
calling the police and submitting to a medical examination. See Kelly Alison Behre, 
Ensuring Choice and Voice for Campus Sexual Assault Victims: A Call for Victims’ 
Attorneys, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 293, 352 (2017) (describing the “harmful rape myth . . . of ‘the 
perfect victim,’ promoting the idea that real victims of sexual assault respond to trauma in 
one uniform manner”). As used here, the phrase also does not include a “perfect victim” 
from the perspective of the perpetrator to identify and target vulnerable individuals for 
predation. It is poignant, and perhaps ironic, however, that often perpetrators identify 
“perfect victims” in part based on the target’s perceived credibility issues. See People v. 
Fortson, 421 P.3d 1236, 1253 (Colo. App. 2018) (Berger, J., concurring) (discussing expert 
testimony at a child sexual assault trial describing the “perfect victim” as one with 
“developmental or credibility issues, [who is] thus less likely to be believed”). 
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provoke or invite her attack, and who is thus morally blameless.139 Despite 
the #MeToo Movement’s attempts to direct attention to the nuances of 
sexual assault, and particularly the nuances of victim responses in 
vulnerable, coercive settings, society still identifies “the image of the 
‘victim’ [as] a blameless, pure stereotype, with whom all can identify.”140 A 
“victim” is “an elderly person robbed of her life savings, an ‘innocent 
bystander’ injured or killed during a holdup, or a brutally ravaged rape 
victim. ‘Victims’ are not prostitutes beaten senseless . . . drug addicts 
mugged and robbed . . . or misdemeanants raped by cellmates.”141 
The moral superiority expressed against these “imperfect victims” of 
crimes exists in the messaging institutionalized in modesty-based dress 
codes. A girl who wears a short skirt may very well fall victim to boys 
attempting to look up it, which is a form of sexual predation. But according 
to school administrators, she is not a perfect victim or innocent bystander 
because of her morally questionable choices; as such, she will receive 
discipline rather than protection.142 Only this kind of sexist moral purity test 
can explain why in one high school a girl was “dress coded . . . for wearing 
shorts” just as a male classmate walked by wearing a T-shirt graphically 
depicting a sex act with the phrase “good girls swallow” emblazoned across 
the front.143 The boy received no punishment.144  
The fallacy of the “perfect victim” is thus both factually flawed and 
fundamentally dangerous. Nothing exists in our criminal law to provide 
                                                                                                                 
 139. See Martha Chamallas, Lucky: The Sequel, 80 IND. L.J. 441, 442 (2005) (describing 
the mythical “‘perfect’ [rape] victim, who is young, white, and a virgin”); see also Brenner 
et al., supra note 126, at 540 (“Rape myths inform the ‘ideal victimhood’ requirement that a 
victim be ‘carrying out a respectable project’ and is ‘not to be blamed.’”). 
 140. Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 951 
(1985). 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Miller, supra note 67 (quoting school officials who “sent home 70 students for 
the way they were dressed. Girls who wore skirts that were ‘too short’ . . . were sent 
home . . . [because] boys would be able to ‘peer up the girl’s skirts while they climbed the 
stairs’ . . . [instead of] teaching boys that looking up girl[s’] skirts is wrong—no matter how 
convenient the angle might be—they enforce a rule that punishes a high school girl for being 
sexualized by her peers.”). 
 143. Laura Bates, How School Dress Codes Shame Girls and Perpetuate Rape Culture, 
TIME (May 22, 2015, 8:00 AM EDT), https://time.com/3892965/everydaysexism-school-
dress-codes-rape-culture/ (“‘I walked past another student wearing a shirt depicting two stick 
figures: the male holding down the female[’]s head in his crotch and saying “good girls 
swallow.” Teachers walked right past him and didn’t say a thing.’”).  
 144. Id. 
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sliding scale protection for victims of rape or sexual assault based on the 
perceived moral innocence of the victim. Yet the perpetuation of the myth 
that only virginal, modest girls and women can be raped creates license for 
the very types of modesty-based and shame-based regulations reinforcing a 
culture of impunity for predatory behavior. 
C. The Unstoppable Male 
School administrators place the onus on girls to cover up their bodies, 
because boys “simply cannot help themselves,” “cannot resist the 
temptation,” or “simply cannot resist the urge” to make unwanted sexual 
advances. These dangerous claims take the “boys will be boys” trope a step 
further by claiming an instinctual, primal urge within boys to sexualize girls 
absolves boys from responsibility when they do so.145  
Absolving boys from responsibility, or at least mitigating their 
culpability, finds parallels in criminal sexual assault adjudication as well. 
Even if a factfinder refuses to imply consent to engage in a sexual act from 
the victim’s provocative dress, it may nevertheless mitigate the punishment 
imposed because it is “reasonable” or “understandable” for the perpetrator 
to behave the way he did given the primal irresistibility of the situation. 
This approach represents a subtle reframing of the “perfect victim” myth. 
Instead of concluding that a scantily clad rape victim is less deserving of 
society’s protection, the factfinder concludes that the rape perpetrator is less 
deserving of society’s condemnation because of his innate primal desire to 
have sexual contact with a scantily clad female.146  
This “primal urge” theory finds currency in another, perhaps less clearly 
analogous set of cases: revoked consent or “post-penetration rape” cases.147 
Until 2003, no state recognized a revocation of consent as valid once a sex 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Linda R. Hirshman, Was There Sex Before Calvin Klein, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
929, 937 (1996) (“Sociobiologists would say that nothing is to be done. Boys will be boys; 
they will rape and pillage and abandon their offspring. . . . Boys will be boys, unless women 
will be slaves.”). 
 146. Christine Chambers Goodman, Protecting the Party Girl: A New Approach for 
Evaluating Intoxicated Consent, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 57, 95–96 (“In evaluating the 
reasonableness of expressions of dissent . . . ‘we need to know the baseline of the person to 
judge when a state of affairs is an evil or benefit for them’ to help us decide whether silence 
should constitute consent.”). 
 147. See generally Amanda O. Davis, Comment, Clarifying the Issue of Consent: The 
Evolution of Post-Penetration Rape Law, 34 STETSON L. REV. 729 (2005). 
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act began.148 In other words, once a consensual act of sexual intercourse 
began, neither party had a legal right to change their mind and stop the 
act.149 Female victims bringing rape charges against men who ignored their 
post-penetration revocations of consent were regularly met with the 
“uncontrollable male” defense, articulated by the defendant in In re John Z: 
By essence of the act of sexual intercourse, a male’s primal urge 
to reproduce is aroused. It is therefore unreasonable for a female 
and the law to expect a male to cease having sexual intercourse 
immediately upon withdrawal of consent. It is only natural, fair 
and just that a male be given a reasonable amount of time in 
which to quell his primal urge . . . .150 
Citing this “myth of the unstoppable male,” “the defendant disclaimed 
both control over and responsibility for his actions, and denied legal 
culpability for imposing sex on an unwilling partner.”151 This defense 
claims that men, “by their very natures, would be biologically incapable of 
abiding by a law that required them to listen and respond when their 
partners withdrew consent for sex.”152 While the California Supreme Court 
ultimately ruled against the perpetrator, it left the “unstoppable male” myth 
intact, holding instead that the perpetrator had “ample time” to quell his 
desires.153 Fortunately, following the outcry from this case and a growing 
recognition of the need to fix this crazy loophole, states began enacting 
statutes expressly making post-penetration rape a crime.154 Currently, only 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Erin G. Palmer, Recent Development, Antiquated Notions of Womanhood and the 
Myth of the Unstoppable Male: Why Post-Penetration Rape Cases Should Be a Crime in 
North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1258, 1277 (2004) (“[O]n July 25, 2003, [Illinois] became 
the first state to enact a statute expressly making post-penetration rape a crime.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Battle v. State, 414 A.2d 1266, 1270 (Md. 1980) (“[I]f th[e] consent is 
withdrawn prior to the act of penetration, then it cannot be said that she has consented to 
sexual intercourse. On the other hand, ordinarily if she consents prior to penetration and 
withdraws consent following penetration, there is no rape.”). 
 150. 60 P.3d 183, 187 (Cal. 2003). 
 151. Palmer, supra note 148, at 1276. 
 152. Id. 
 153. In re John Z, 60 P.3d at 187. 
 154. Mary Huff, The “New” Withdrawal of Consent Standard in Maryland Rape Law: A 
Year After Baby v. State, MODERN AM., Fall 2009, at 14, 15 (vol. 5, no. 2), https://digital 
commons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=tma (describing 
pace of legislative and judicial progress across the country); Molly Redden, ‘No Doesn’t 
Really Mean No’: North Carolina Law Means Women Can’t Revoke Consent for Sex, 
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2017, 7:00 AM EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ 
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North Carolina fails to recognize the validity of post-penetration consent 
revocation.155  
Admittedly, a boy leering at a girl’s body in school after being told to 
stop differs significantly from a man continuing to have sex with a woman 
after being told to stop. But the myth justifying diminished culpability in 
both situations is similar: boys and men have primal urges to sexualize and 
have sex with girls and women, they biologically cannot be expected to 
resist these urges, and thus legally they will not be held fully responsible for 
their nonconsensual actions. This male-centric, hetero-normative 
accommodation is insulting to men and does incredible harm to women, 
and yet finds a home in school policies governing our children.  
V. Conclusion 
Stephanie Hughes, the Woodford High School student pictured at the 
beginning of this Article, missed hours of instruction waiting in the 
principal’s office for her mother to leave work and bring clothing to cover 
her exposed collarbone.156 Her mother gave her the scarf pictured below, 
which brought Stephanie into compliance with the school’s dress code (see 
Figure 2).157 
However, the principal deemed the scarf “inappropriate” attire for school 
and sent Stephanie home for the rest of the day.158 This episode led to 
widespread protests at the school, eventually culminating in the creation of 
a documentary by one of Stephanie’s classmates entitled Shame: A 
Documentary on School Dress Code.159 The outcry over Woodford High’s 
policies, and the documentary itself, helped place greater pressure on public  
                                                                                                                 
2017/jun/24/north-carolina-rape-legal-loophole-consent-state-v-way (explaining that North 
Carolina law “prevented prosecutors from charging” rape in post-penetration withdrawal of 
consent cases and state senator Jeff Jackson failed in his efforts to introduce legislation to fix 
this “loophole”). 
 155. Redden, supra note 154 (quoting Senator Jackson) (“North Carolina is the only state 
in the country where no doesn’t really mean no. We have a clear ethical obligation to fix this 
obvious defect in our rape law.”). 
 156. Lewis, supra note 1.  
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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schools across the country to revisit existing dress code policies.160 Yet the 
prevalence and problematic messaging of these modesty-based dress codes 
persist today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
This Article presents a descriptive parallel between these two worlds—
the schoolhouse and the courthouse—and a normative reflection on the 
corrosive impacts of the messaging sent in each world when we obsess over 
the sexual nature of a woman’s clothing. It does not provide any empirical 
data, or even anecdotal proof, of a direct link between increasingly 
sexualized school dress codes and rape victim credibility discounts in 
criminal law. That research, to the extent it is possible to conduct, would 
represent a welcome and helpful next step in this discussion. Until then, 
these short remarks provide a useful lens through which to critically 
examine the continued desire to police but failure to protect girls’ and 
women’s bodies. 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Cf. id. (describing public support for students’ proposed dress code).  
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